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Introduction: Regarding senice and leadership 
Many of today's universities encourage students to develop an ethic of service. 
Administrators, faculty, and staff members accompany students in campus-wide service 
activities; a number of collegiate honor societies reward students who engage in 
community service; and some academic programs require students to volunteer with local 
non-profit organizations. At its best, service learning inspires students to make a general 
commitment to service. The current emphasis placed on service learning in today's 
educational system reveals an emerging academic perspective not only on the value 
service has as an educational device but also on the significant role service plays in 
society. For example, with particular regard for service's function in society, the Jepson 
School of Leadership Studies promotes leadership as service to society. Its mission 
statement reads, "The Jepson School will develop people who understand the moral 
responsibilities of leadership and are prepared to exercise leadership in service to 
society." As a student at the Jepson School, I have experienced firsthand the emphasis 
placed on service in the leadership studies curriculum. In fact, the Jepson School's 
requisite service learning course inspired this project. 
Entitled "Service to Society," the class requires students to serve a minimum of 
thirty hours in the community in addition to participating in more traditional classroom 
activities. Using relevant theoretical and practical texts to provide the critical background 
for understanding the nature of service, class members analyze the duty to serve others 
and the characteristics of ethical serving behavior. Ultimately, the course addresses broad 
societal concerns such as justice, equality, and change in order to demonstrate how 
service acts as a means to better society. The class aims to instill in students the belief 
that, by serving others, they may act as leaders - advancing the cause of social justice, 
correcting disparities in social equality, and inspiring beneficial social change. 
Given the dedication required to achieve social progress, service ought to be 
distinguished from other fonns of helping behavior. In The Call of Service, a principal 
text in the "Service to Society" course at the Jepson School, author Robert Coles includes 
the following examples of service action: social and political struggle, community 
service, personal gestures and encounters, charity, religiously sanctioned action, 
government-sanctioned action, and service to country (Ch. 2). For Coles, while 
differences in the objectives and motives of various service behaviors distinguish one 
type of service action from another, a common denominator exists in every ideal service 
equation: the servant's commitment to improving society through his own continued 
effort and long-standing dedication (33). Thus, service is best understood as particular 
long-tenn commitments of public assistance. Considering the substantial investments 
demanded of servants in tenns of their time, effort, and overall dedication, which service 
as a long-term commitment to societal progress requires, service stands out as a specific 
social means to provide benefit to others. An individual can help others to varying 
degrees, through an array of action. For example, the volunteerism of a Peace Corps 
member is justifiably viewed as different in kind to the commitment an individual makes 
to hand out sandwiches to homeless people on Thanksgiving. While the latter helps 
others, the fonner is engaged in service, because the long-tenn commitment of the Peace 
Corps requires the restructuring of the servant's ends. Similarly, service does not refer to 
the immediate help which an individual provides to others in emergency situations. For 
example, rescuing a drowning child ought not to be considered service action. White 
saving the child's life does provide cJear, substantial benefit to him, the helping behavior 
consists of a single, temporary act and, therefore, is not representative of service action. 
Service ideally produces substantial net benefit for the individual, the group of 
people, or the cause being served. The fundamental reason service exists is that social 
injustice still plagues today's society and people continue to live with their essential 
needs unfulfilled. Ethical service aims to reduce this injustice and satisfy these 
individuals' basic needs. Since the satisfaction of these needs is the fundamental purpose 
of service, the root of its existence, service traditionally is considered justified when the 
servant successfully produces net benefit for others. The benefits received by those being 
served ought to outweigh any costs incurred by them as a result of service. Without the 
ability to assure the realization of this outcome, individuals who engage in service must 
merely aim for this objective end in order to act ethically. Servants can only be held 
accountable for their subjective intentions. This means that, as long as a servant aims to 
provide benefit for others, the accepted objective end of service, she has done the best 
that she can do, for which is all that she is reasonably held responsible. 
If service's purpose is understood to be to produce benefit solely for the people 
being served, the assessment of ethical service action only considers whether or not the 
interests of others are advanced. In this model, how service affects the servant's own 
needs and interests remains ethically irrelevant. The judgment of the servant's morality 
relies upon his intent to improve the lives of others. Since the justification of service 
remains contingent upon the satisfaction of others' interests, when evaluating the moral 
value of service, the interests of the individuals being served are prioritized over the 
interests of the servants. Greater moral weight is assigned to the needs of others. 
Consequently, servants, as the other-concerned participants in service action, receive 
relatively little consideration in the determination of ethical service action. In fact, the 
interests of the servant may be sacrificed in order to secure benefit for the individuals 
being served. Given the other-interested objectives of service, this sacrifice is typically 
viewed as justified. A servant's sacrifice may appear to be a necessary consequence, 
since service occurs as a result of others' need existing. Without injustices to correct, for 
example, in an ideal world, the purpose of service would radically change. Service action 
would perhaps disappear completely. 
Similar to this model of service ethics, characterizations of ethical leadership 
depict other-interested, rather than self-interested, objectives which justify action. In fact, 
this tendency to view the ethical leader as working for the benefit of others appears 
throughout both historical and theoretical conceptions ofleadership. Ancient and modem 
philosophical texts present fundamentally similar understandings ofleadership's purpose: 
to serve the common interests of others. Several prominent leadership theories, such as 
servant leadership, transfonnational leadership, and charismatic leadership, characterize 
moral leadership as for the benefit of followers. In these conceptions ofleadership, other-
oriented leader objectives determine its moral legitimacy. Recognizing this trend, Terry 
Price writes in The Encyclopedia of Leadership entry on "Ethics," "Commentators who 
make their normative commitments explicit by offering recommendations for how 
leaders ought to behave often identify good leadership with what thinkers from Plato to 
Burns hold is necessary for leadership itself, namely, concern for the good of others" ( 4). 
In contrast to these normative theories of service and leadership, I propose that the 
evaluation of ethical service must consider the interests of the servant in the justification 
of service action. As alluded to above, the inspiration for this project and my distinct 
stance on ethical service began while I was enrolled in the "Service to Society" course at 
the Jepson School during my sophomore year of college. Having recently read Ayn 
Rand's novels, The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, I maintained a strictly egoistic 
perspective on individuals' responsibilities to others for most of the semester. I believed 
that I, as well as everyone else, had no responsibility to help others with serious social 
needs. My opinion stood in stark contrast to the course materials which promote service 
action as a moral duty, justified by the benefit it causes for others. Overall, the course 
presents service as a vehicle through which leaders promote societal benefit, but it would 
be unfair to suggest that it depicts ethical servants as completely altruistic. The .. Service 
to Society" course by no means ignores the benefits that service provides for individuals 
who serve others. Class discussions often return to the satisfactions servants experience 
as a result of service. As outlined in Coles' book, The Call of Service, these satisfactions 
include a sense of accomplishment, a feeling of belonging, and an affirmation of purpose 
for the servant (Ch. 3). Although these satisfactions recognize how servants benefit from 
serving others, service remains typically justified by its other-oriented purpose. While 
servants may benefit from their service commitments, their benefit does not factor into 
the justification of the service. It is not considered a necessary condition for ethical 
service. Instead, the servant's beriefit is viewed as an added positive outcome. 
Ultimately, the community service I performed in the "Service to Society" course 
allowed me to experience the benefits and the satisfactions of service. I realized I liked to 
serve others. Not only that, as a result of the course's in-depth discussion of justice and 
equality, I also began to understand the duty individuals, as members of society, have to 
help others in need. Yet, I still could not ascribe to the course's proposal that ethical 
service action is solely justified by the benefit it produces for those individuals being 
served. Service remained a worthwhile activity, I suspected, to some large extent, 
because of the personal benefits I received from it. While the hours of English language 
instruction undoubtedly benefited the Bosnian family I was tutoring, my assessment of 
the service's overall value gave equal consideration to my interests. Had I not been 
receiving any benefits or any sense of satisfaction from the service, it would not have 
been justified on account of the benefit I was providing for the family. Suspecting that 
my interests also mattered, I felt that they ought to count equally. My interests ought to 
be significant to the ethical justification of the service. Yet, how could a justification of 
service that considers the interests of servants as equally important as the interests of the 
individuals being served, who have serious social needs, be correct? My thesis serves as 
my answer to this question. 
My theory for ethical service defends the claim that for service to be justified, it 
must be the case not only that the benefits outweigh the costs for the individuals 
being served but also that the benefits outweigh the costs for the servant. The moral 
requirements on the servants• interests must be as stringent as the moral requirements 
usually placed on the interests of the individuals being served. Since service action is 
justified by the benefit it produces for servants as well as others, I argue that servants 
ought to pursue service activities only when they anticipate that the benefits for 
themselves will outweigh the costs. This theory of ethical service signifies that servants 
should prioritize their interests in making choices about service. In servants' decisions to 
serve others, servants' own interests are placed ahead of the interests of some, but not all, 
others. Prioritization, therefore, does not signify that the interests of the servant account 
for more than the interests of others. A servant has to help others in the pursuit of their 
ends, but her own ends get put first in the choice of whom she will help. She prioritizes 
her interests in the selection of service and chooses particular fonns of service which 
align with her ends. For example, the servant who enjoys children and the outdoors is 
allowed to limit her service to cases in which these two interests are involved. Within 
these limitations, in order for her service to be ethical, she must engage in service in 
which the benefits she receives outweigh the costs. In this theory of ethical service, the 
servant's determination of benefits and costs are subjective. The servant's ends define 
what constitutes a benefit or a cost for her. As discussed above, unable to assure that the 
required outcome of benefit for herself as well as for others is secured, all the servant can 
be held responsible for, and thus accountable for, is that her intention aimed at this end. 
The justification of ethical service which considers the servants' interests as 
equally important as the interests of the individuals being served has implications for the 
discussion of ethical servant motivation. If it is understood that service's only purpose is 
to produce benefit for others, it is unlikely that servants could be ethically motivated by 
self-interest. One would assume that having others' interests as the justifying determinant 
of ethical service would demand that servants be motivated to serve others out of an 
altruistic desire to advance others' interests. In contrast, assuming that the justification of 
service also includes the benefit it produces for the servant, it would seem to fol1ow that 
the servant is allowed to be motivated by self-interest. This signifies that servants can be 
motivated to serve others because of the benefit they themselves will receive from the 
service. In fact, in order for the service to be ethical, meaning that it also produces overall 
benefit for oneself and not just for others, it would appear that a degree of self-interested 
motivation is the best way to assure that these self-interested ends are likely realized. 
However, as long as servants receive more benefits than costs from service, they may be 
altruistically motivated as well. Thus, motivation is not a determining factor in the 
justification of ethical service. Instead, service is justified by the following n\'O outcomes: 
when the servant produces net benefit for the individuals being served and the servant 
herself receives net benefit from performing the service. 
My thesis begins with an overview of historical perspectives and current 
leadership theories which conceptualize leadership as primarily other-interested. This 
review establishes the legitimacy of viewing other-interested ends as the standard 
prescription for leadership's purpose. The historical discussion remains crucial to the 
formulation of a normative conception of leadership as service. In addition, it 
demonstrates how few modem leadership scholars consider the potential for leaders to 
prioritize their own interests in leadership, especially when understood as service. 
Writing on leadership ethics, Price agrees with this conclusion and comments, "What 
these normative theories of leadership have in common with traditional ethical theory is a 
firm commitment to the opposition between the demands of self-interest and moral 
requirements that protect the interests of others" (6). 
Having established the theoretical consensus on leadership's purpose against 
which I argue, I discuss my theory of ethical service in tenns of three philosophical 
traditions: utilitarianism, ethical egoism, and Kantianism. I dedicate a chapter to each 
moral tradition. I begin each chapter with an explanation of the relevant foundational 
principles of the particular philosophy being addressed. I then describe the implications 
the philosophy has for service action. I end the discussion with an argument that either 
rejects or supports the implications the philosophy has for understanding ethical service. 
Regarding the philosophy of utilitarianism, I demonstrate how its standards for ethical 
action reflect an inadequate concern for the individual, specifically for the servant herself. 
I then examine ethical egoism, the philosophy which appears to relate most readily to my 
theory on ethical service, in order to show that one can have too much concern for 
oneself in action. Ultimately, Kant's moral theory regarding duties to others and duties to 
oneself provide the necessary philosophical framework for me to justify my argument for 
a view of service in which the requirements regarding benefits to the servant are as 
stringent as the requirements regarding benefits to the individuals being served. 
I end my thesis with a more detailed discussion of the nuances ofmy theory of 
ethical service. I outline the implications this theory has for performing service and 
ultimately leadership action in general. To conclude, this project represents the 
culmination of my three years at the Jepson School of Leadership Studies. It is the 
product of my most challenging and rewarding intellectual experiences in leadership 
studies and reflects the personal development I believe I have undergone while at Jepson. 
Chapter One: The other-oriented purpose of ethical leadership 
Through a survey of ancient and modem philosophical texts, the historical trend 
of understanding ethical leadership as justified by its other~oriented purpose emerges. In 
the history of political thought. moral leadership is characterized as that which works for 
the benefit of others. Ethical leaders are those who pursue the interests of others or the 
common good. Several prominent leadership theories, specifically, servant leadership. 
transformational leadership, and charismatic leadership, characterize leadership in similar 
tenns. While these philosophical perspectives focus on what grounds ethical leadership, 
their prescriptions have implications for the evaluation of ethical leader motivation. 
Given the other-oriented objective of moral leadership, altruism is often represented as 
the desirable motivational complement to the prescribed ends of leadership. Although 
altruistic leader motivation is not always considered in all of the following conceptions of 
ethical leadership, its pervasiveness reinforces the argument that the prevailing view of 
ethical leadership recognizes it as justified by its other-oriented purpose. 
Written around 360 BCE, Plato's Republic, offers one of the first conceptions of 
1eadership in political philosophy. In his portrayal of the ideal leader. whom he 
characterizes as the philosopher-king, Plato prescribes a fonn of other-interested 
leadership. As revealed through Socrates• discussion with Thrasymachus, Plato believes 
that the moral leader prioritizes his followers' interests. Socrates likens leadership to a 
craft, arguing that: 
No one in any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, seeks or orders what is 
advantageous to himself. but what is advantageous to his subjects; the ones of 
whom he is himself the craftsman. It is to his subjects and what is advantageous 
and proper to them that he looks, and everything he says and does he says and 
does for them. (38) 
14 
In this passage, the subjects' advantage, their benefit, not only represents the objective 
end of a ruler's action but also seems to reflect the source of a ruler's motivation to rule. 
Given the other-oriented ends which Socrates prescribes and his statement that 
"everything he says and does, he says and does for themt he seems to promote altruistic 
rather than self-interested motivation in leaders. They seek the good of their subjects. 
Plato's allegory of the cave, appearing in another section of the Republic, also 
implies that moral leaders are altruistic and even self-sacrificial. First, they lead in order 
to further the ends of their subjects. Second, their pursuit of others• ends often requires 
the sacrifice of their own. When Socrates states that the leader must go back down into 
the cave, Glaucon responds, "Then are we to do them an injustice by making them live a 
worse life when they could live a better one?" (134). Socrates answers: 
You are forgetting again that it isn't the law's concern to make any one class in 
the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the 
city by bringing the citizens into hannony with each other through persuasion or 
compulsion and by making them share with each other the benefits that each class 
can confer on the community. (134) 
Socrates responds that while requiring a ruler to sacrifice his personal happiness may 
appear to be an injustice, it is not appropriately considered as such, since the ruler's 
personal happiness is not of ethical consequence to securing the good of society as a 
whole. Plato, through the voice of Socrates, requires that leadership benefit the collective 
group of followers, even when this purpose implies the loss of happiness for the leader. 
It is thus easy to understand why, in envisioning the ideal society, in which men 
are equally virtuous and just, Socrates proposes that good individuals wou1d compete 
with one another to avoid a position ofleadership ( 40). He explains that the just, moral 
leader, motivated by neither money nor honor, is compelled to lead because of "some 
compulsion or punishment ... brought to bear on [him]" ( 40). He describes what 
motivates good men to assume leadership positions: 
Now, the greatest punishment, if one isn't willing to rule, is to be ruled by 
someone worse than oneself. And I think that it's fear of this that makes decent 
people rule when they do. They approach 'ruling not as something good or 
something to be enjoyed, but as something necessary. (40) 
As voiced by Socrates in this argument, Plato stresses that leadership is not naturally in 
the leader's self-interest; therefore, his desire to lead must be compelled by external, 
unwanted consequences, This promotes a self-sacrificial quality to the assumption of 
leadership, since it is not completely of the leader's free will nor does it promote his own 
benefit. While leaders may appear self-interested in that they avoid being ruled by worse 
individuals, their decision to lead actually represents their respect for the overall good. 
Another early philosophical text, Aristotle's Politics, requires that moral 
leadership advance the ends of the collective of society. Considering political leadership 
in the form of constitutions, Aristotle uses the criteria of promoting communal benefit to 
distinguish between good and bad government. He writes: 
It is evident, then, that those constitutions that ]ook to the common benefit tum 
out, according to what is unqualifiedly just, to be correct, whereas those which 
look to the benefit of the rulers are mistaken and are deviations from the correct 
constitutions. For they are like rule by a master, whereas a city-state is a 
community of free people. (324) 
According to Aristotle, a constitution's intended beneficiary matters more than its 
particular form: "Whenever the one, the few, or the many rule for the common benefit, 
these constitutions must be correct. But if they aim at the private benefit, whether of the 
one or the few or the multitude, they are deviations" (324-325). Like Plato, Aristotle 
implies the requirement of altruistic motivation in leadership, demanding that leaders 
pursue ''the common profit," his rendition of the common good and indicative of the 
prescribed other-oriented ends of leadership (325). Moving towards a vision of the ideal 
city-state, Aristotle clarifies its purpose: 
Evidently, then, a city-state is not a sharing of a common location, and does not 
exist for the purpose of preventing mutual wrongdoing and exchanging goods. 
Rather, while these must be present if indeed there is to be a city-state, when all of 
them are present there is still not yet a city-state, but only when households and 
families live well as a community whose end is a complete and self-sufficient life. 
(326) 
Interestingly, he specifies that the city-state does not exist to enable the exchange of 
goods between people, but instead, to promote the performance of virtuous actions. 
Relating this to modem leadership theory, Aristotle's philosophy parallels a 
transformational conception ofleadership, based on concern for others' interests, in 
contrast to a transactional understanding, closely associated with an individual's self-
interest (Bass and Steidlmeier, 185-186). He continues: 
So political communities must be taken to exist for the sake of noble actions, and 
not for the sake of living together. Hence those who contribute the most to this 
sort of community have a larger share in the city-state than those who are equal or 
superior in freedom or family but inferior in political virtue, and those who 
surpass in wealth but are surpassed in virtue. (327) 
Aristotle characterizes the political virtue of both the state and the individual in terms of 
the benefit each produces for others. He thus provides a great example of the standard 
view that poor leadership occurs in the form of self-interested transactional leaders. 
The trend of altruistic leader motivation in historical political philosophy 
continues in the work of Thomas Aquinas. Representative of a traditionally Christian 
understanding ofleadership, Aquinas, in his thirteenth century treatise, On Kingship, 
communicates his vision of the moral leader in the form of a king who appears similar to 
an altruistic servant. Invoking Plato's analogy of the leader as shepherd, Aquinas 
compares the king to "'a shepherd who seeks the common good of the people and not his 
own individual good'' (398). Like Plato's description of the ideal leader in the form of a 
philosopher-king, Aquinas understands the leader as a servant interested in acting for his 
followers' benefit. Similar to Aristotle's conception of just governments, he writes: 
If a ruler should direct a community of free persons for the common good of the 
people, there will be a right and just regime, as befits free persons. And if the 
governance of a ruler be ordained for the private good of the ruler and not for the 
common good of the people, there will be an unjust and wicked regime. (398) 
In Aquinas' portrayal of moral leadership, leaders work to the benefit of followers. 
This justification ofleadership appears even in Niccolo Machiavelli's famous 
work, The Prince. Underneath his assertion in the need for leaders to engage in seemingly 
unethical behavior in order to maintain power, he portrays proper leadership as 
considering the good it produces for others. Machiavelli allows for a leader to behave in 
ways that seem unethical, with one intention being to maintain his personal power. 
Although this seems to reflect the leader's prioritization of his own interests, Machiavelli 
also characterizes this purpose in other-oriented terms, since the order itself which results 
from a constant source of leadership benefits the common good. For example, 
Machiavelli requires that the prince appear to be generous instead of actually be 
generous, because this behavior ultimately benefits the people more than that of a 
spendthrift prince. He writes: 
So a ruler should not care about being thought miserly, for it means he will be 
able to avoid robbing his subjects; he will be able to defend himself; he will not 
become poor and despicable, and he wi11 not be forced to become rapacious. This 
is one of those vices that make successful government possible. (449) 
Machiavelli, notorious for prescribing leadership in the fonn of a purely self-interested 
prince, actually promotes leadership in which a leader's self-interest and their concern for 
others are not as juxtaposed as they are usually construed to be. Machiavelli's leaders 
may appear overwhelmingly self-interested; however, Machiavelli does not obviously 
promote selfish ends on a larger scale. Machiavelli's prescription ofleadership's other-
oriented ends is prominent in his political treatise, Discourses on the First Ten Books of 
Titus Livius. Presenting an even stronger case for other-oriented objectives in leadership, 
Machiavelli distinguishes between good and bad leadership, characterizing good leaders 
as ''putting their own interests second and the public good first" ( 472). Describing the 
fonn of just governments, Machiavelli uses Aristotle's archetypal constitutions to 
distinguish between good and bad political systems. He agrees with Aristotle's 
requirement that ethical political bodies work for the benefit of society as a whole. 
The understanding of political society in the form of a social contract appears in 
the political philosophies of Enlightenment thinkers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. In 
Leviathan, Hobbes describes the social contract as a covenant between men. He writes: 
Lastly, the agreement ... of men, is by covenant only, which is artificial: and 
therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides covenant) to 
make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep 
them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit. (547) 
In Hobbes' perspective, man is self-interested to a point of detriment. Therefore, 
morality, a consequence of the covenant, is grounded in a constrained form of self-
interest, since unrestrained self-interest ultimately benefits no one. For Hobbes. 
leadership, in the form of government, works to extricate men from their selfish, self-
destructive nature. In Hobbes' conception of the commonwealth, the leader derives 
authority from his followers and acts to protect their interests. If the leader does not fulfill 
this required objective, followers have no duty to obey. Hobbes writes, "The obligation of 
subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power 
lasteth, by which he is able to protect them" (564). This signifies that when the sovereign 
no longer serves his subjects' interests, they may reject his authority. Consequently, 
Hobbes' portrayal of the social contract communicates the standard historical perspective 
that leadership exists to protect followers' interests. 
Locke, in his The Second Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter Concerning 
Toferation, grounds civil society even more deeply in the authority of the people. Locke 
describes why individuals give up the liberty they enjoy in the state of nature to form 
political societies: 
For all being kings as much as [ each other], every man his equal, and the greater 
part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has 
in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure ... (therefore,] it is not without reason, 
that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already 
united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, 
and estates, which I call by the general name, property. (657-8) 
Established by the people, government strives to benefit the common good. Locke writes, 
"The power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to 
extend farther, than the common good; ... to be directed to no other end, but the peace, 
safety, and public good of the people" (659). This concern for the collective benefit in 
society signifies that leaders prioritize the ends of others and, therefore, promotes the 
standard view that good leadership demands primarily other-concerned leadership. Social 
contract theory represents the political priority of concern for followers. This priority is 
derived from the view that followers themselves are the source of authority that 
legitimates leadership. For Hobbes and Locke, who, although to different degrees, view 
man as primarily self-interested, the establishment of political society appears as a 
transaction in which natural liberties are exchanged for the civil protection of these 
liberties, now understood as rights. Therefore, both political thinkers propose that the 
purpose of government, or leadership, is to regulate the injustices which unavoidably 
result from man's uninhibited self-interest. 
The last political philosopher to be discussed, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, similarly 
conceptualizes leadership's authority as justified only when it is granted by the collective. 
In his Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, Rousseau 
concludes that "the commitments that bind us to the body politic are obligatory only 
because they are mutual" (782). In this description, Rousseau agrees with Hobbes and 
Locke and assumes that legitimate leadership occurs only when it serves the collective 
ends of others. Unlike Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau envisions man, although still self-
interested, as enjoying equality and peace in the state of nature. This occurs, because "the 
state of nature is the state in which the concern for our self-preservation is the least 
prejudicial to that of others" (735). In the Discourse, Rousseau conveys a very negative 
perception of leaders, since they arguably deceive people into giving up their natural 
liberties for the sake of property and protection, thus granting leadership its authority 
over the people. Describing man's fall from the state of nature, Rousseau critiques the 
self-serving intentions of the first leaders and argues that they "invented specious 
reasons" such as rules of justice and peace in order to convince others to unite and 
eventually serve them (747). Rousseau's regard for equality between men causes him to 
be critical of leadership as a whole. He writes, "In relations between men, the worst that 
can happen to someone is for him to see himself at the discretion of someone else" (7 48). 
While Rousseau criticizes the self-interest of the very first leaders in the Discourse, he 
continues to reject self-interested leader objectives in his assessment of leadership in 
political society as a whole in On the Social Contract. In this treatise, Rousseau 
specifically condemns leaders when they lead because of "the pleasure [they feel] in 
commanding" (772). He concludes that leaders, as representatives of the collective, ought 
to lead in order to maintain "the common interest," or forced equality in society (777). 
Concerned with equality, Rousseau represents a unique perspective on self-
interest His conception of the social contract reflects leadership as a transformational 
vehicle instead of a transactional necessity, as it is in Hobbes' and Locke's perspectives. 
While the self-interest of followers is the primary concern for Hobbes and Locke, 
Rousseau is interested in the opportunity that the social contract provides for man to have 
moral agency. He writes: 
Although in this state [of civil society] he deprives himself of several of the 
advantages belonging to him in the state of nature, he regains such great ones. His 
faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas are broadened, his feelings are 
ennobled, his entire soul is elevated to such a height that ... he ought constantly 
to bless that happy moment ... which transformed him from a stupid, limited 
animal into an intelligent being. (778) 
This passage stresses the benefits people receive from human interaction and society. In 
the state of nature, man is too individualistic. In civil society, he is transformed. He is 
more intelligent, more capable, and more profound. Rousseau continues to remark on this 
transformation: 
This passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces quite a remarkable 
change in man, for it substitutes justice for instinct in his behavior and gives his 
actions a moral quality they previously lacked. (778) 
In the supporting paragraphs, Rousseau notes that once man is bound to another by the 
social contract, he is forced to define justice and adhere to a moral code. From this, 
Rousseau implies that only when living with and working for others does man's life gain 
meaning. Rousseau's social contract signifies the creation of a collective will and the 
complete loss of traditional individualism. a change in man that he admires. However, 
this transfonnation does not represent the complete loss of self-interest nor does it apply 
to the collective body of society and exclude leaders. Instead, both leaders and members 
of society at large move beyond simple self-interest to an enlightened fonn of it. 
Rousseau's conception of the social contract is consistent with that of Hobbes and Locke 
in that the legitimacy of leadership is derived from the authority of the collective and, 
thus, the purpose ofleadership is to serve the interests of the collective. What is original 
to Rousseau's version of the social contract is its positive, transformational effect on 
everyone's self-interest. 
Moving into today's understandings of ethical leadership, three prominent 
leadership theories conceptualize leader behavior as other-interested action. Robert K. 
Greenleaf s servant leadership most explicitly applies to the discussion ofleadership as 
service. In his classic text, Servant Leadership, he describes the quintessential servant 
leader: 
The servant-leader is servant first. ... It begins with the natural feeling that one 
wants to serve. to serve first. Then conscious choice brings one to aspire to lead. 
He is sharply different from the person who is leader first, perhaps because of the 
need to assuage an unusual power drive or to acquire material possessions. For 
such it will be a later choice to serve - after leadership is established. (7) 
Greenleaf describes the critical difference between leader-first and servant-first leaders in 
terms of the servant's consideration of the interests of those individuals being served. He 
writes, "The difference manifests itself in the care taken by the servant-first to make sure 
that other people's highest priority needs are being served" (7). Servant leaders prioritize 
the interests of others. While this does not necessarily mean that they ignore their own 
interests, having the ends of others as their primary objective would not allow them to 
pay attention to their own interests with equal concern. Promoting a high level of other-
oriented concern in ethical leaders, Greenleafs conception of leadership recognizes 
altruistic motivation as a required component of ethical leadership. 
In an article entitled, "Servant Leadership: its origin, development, and 
application in organizations," authors Sen Sendjaya and James C. Sarros agree with this 
characterization. They argue that servant leadership is based on altrnistic leader 
motivation (60). Interestingly, Sendjaya and Sarros propose a different origin for the 
concept of servant leadership. They write: 
As appealing and refreshing as Greenleaf s conceptualization of servant 
leadership is, Greenleaf is not the individual who first introduced the notion of 
servant leadership to everyday human endeavor. It was Christianity's founder, 
Jesus Christ, who first taught the concept of servant leadership. From the narrative 
accounts of his life in the Bible, it is evident that servant leadership was taught 
and practiced more than two thousand years ago. (58) 
They cite a passage from the Gospel of Luke, when Jesus states, "I am among you as one 
who serves'' (60). They continue, "The first premise, 'I serve because I am the leader' 
signifies the act of altruism" (60). In recognizing the presence of servant leadership in the 
acts of Jesus Christ, Sendjaya and Sarros depict leader motivation once again as ethical 
when it is altruistic. 
The theory of servant leadership has pronounced similarities to transformational 
leadership and charismatic leadership, the two prominent leadership theories yet to be 
considered. At the most simplistic level, similarities between the theories exist in their 
concern for followers' interests. In Leadership, James MacGregor Burns' crucial 
contribution to the field of leadership studies, ethical leadership is defined by the moral 
transformation it inspires in both leaders and followers. Explaining the theory of 
transforming leadership, Bums writes: 
The essential strategy of leadership in mobilizing power is to recognize the arrays 
of motives and goals in potential followers, to appeal to those motives by words 
and action, and to strengthen those motives and goals in order to increase the 
power of leadership, thereby changing the environment in which both followers 
and leaders act. ( 40) 
While Bums considers both parties of the leadership dynamic, he maintains that 
leadership is primarily interested in followers' concerns. Bums' emphasis on followers is 
subtle, yet it is present in his theory. For example, Bums specifies, "The first task of 
leadership is to bring to consciousness the followers' sense of their own needs, values, 
and goals" (41). From this statement, Burns reveals that the principal objective of 
leadership is to affect the moral consciousness of followers rather than leaders. Providing 
more evidence, he writes, "Moral leadership emerges from, and always returns to, the 
fundamental wants and needs, aspirations, and values of the followers" (4). While Bums' 
transfonning leadership is defined by its intent to raise the morality of all concerned, 
ultimately, transfonning leaders are ethical when they seek the good of followers. Burns 
himself does not directly mention the need for altruism in leader motivation, yet his 
portrayal of transforming leaders as primarily and personally concerned with followers' 
interests reflects a necessary degree of altruistic intention. 
Although Burns avoids an explicit requirement of altruistic leader motivation, 
Bernard M. Bass and Paul Steidlmeier make this distinction in their theory of authentic 
transformational leadership. Altruistic leader motivation is one of the four criteria they 
demand of moral leadership. Distinguishing between authentic and inauthentic 
transformational leadership in their article, "Ethics, character, and authentic 
transfonnational leader behavior," they write: 
Both the dynamics and mean-to-ends as well as the ends are different for 
authentic and inauthentic transformational leaders. The authentic are inwardly and 
outwardly concerned about the good that can be achieved for the group, 
organization, or society for which they feel responsible. The inauthentic and 
pseudo-transformational may publicly give the same impression and be idealized 
by their followers for it, but privately be concerned about the good they can 
achieve for themselves. ( 188) 
Bass and Steidlmeier maintain strict lines between the two oppositional motivations of 
self-interest and altruism. They write, "Personalized leaders, primarily concerned with 
their self-interests, could not be truly transformational leaders" (186). While they give 
several arguments to validate this conclusion, they ultimately argue that "followers 
should not be mere means to self-satisfying ends for the leader but should be treated as 
ends themselves" ( 186). They generally focus much less on the effect leadership has on 
leaders. 
Bass and Steidlmeier also promote a comparison between transformational 
leadership and servant leadership. Discussing the need for individualized consideration in 
authentic transformational leadership, which they believe "underscores the necessity of 
altruism ifleadership is to be anything more than authoritarianism" (189), they write: 
The difference between authentic and pseudo-transformational leadership is also 
seen in that authentic transformational leaders, who may have just as much need 
for power as pseudo-transformational leaders, channel the need in socially 
constructive ways into the service of others. (189) 
Explicitly attacking self-interested motivation, Bass and Steidlmeier claim moral 
leadership consists of altruistic leader motivation and action and, therefore, promotes the 
view of leadership as appropriately intended to serve others. In fact, as Patrick Gavan 
O'Shea notes in The Encyclopedia of Leadership entry on "Altruism," "Leadership 
behaviors including charisma, inspiration, and intellectual stimulation are thought to be 
transformational precisely because they compel followers to transcend narrow self-
interest" (5). In this theory of authentic transformational leadership, self-interested 
leaders once again do not represent the prescribed form of leadership. 
The last leadership theory to be discussed, charismatic leadership, also invests in 
other-oriented objectives as the determinant of leadership's moral value. In an article 
entitled, "Beyond the Charismatic Leader: Leadership and Organizational Change," 
David A. Nader and Michael L. Tushman validate the theory: 
The concept of the charismatic leader is not the popular vision of the great speech 
maker or television personality. Rather, a model has emerged from recent work 
aimed at identifying the nature and determinants of a particular type of leadership 
that successfully brings about changes in an individual's values, goals, needs, or 
aspirations. ( 109) 
Charismatic leadership consists ofleader behavior that envisions goals and expectations 
for followers, energizes fol1owers to feel confident in their ability to achieve such ends, 
and enables them to do so, as is possible. Although the theory of charismatic leadership 
does not necessarily signify altruistic leader motivation, the actions of charismatic leaders 
are generally understood as good when performed in the interests of others. 
Jane M. Howell and Bruce J. Avolio in their article. entitled "The ethics of 
charismatic leadership: submission or liberation?," distinguish between ethical and 
unethical charismatic leaders. They write: 
Many charismatic leaders incorporate their followers' hopes, dreams, and 
aspirations in their vision. These leaders ... have moral standards that emphasize 
collective interests of the group, organization, or society. We call these leaders 
'ethical charismatics.' Other charismatic leaders are interested in pursuing their 
own personal vision_ These charismatic leaders control and manipulate their 
followers, promote what is best for themselves rather than their organizations, and 
have moral standards that promote self-interests. We call these leaders 'unethical 
charismatics."' ( 44) 
Throughout their descriptions of ethical and unethical charismatics, Howell and Avolio 
emphasize their belief that ethical charismatic leaders ''use power in socially constructive 
ways to serve others" ( 44). Leadership scholars hesitate to lend support to the theory of 
charismatic leadership because of the personalized motivation and power that this form of 
leadership encourages. The theory is criticized precise1y because it does not ensure the 
good of others. In these assessments, charismatic leaders lose their moral integrity and 
the legitimacy of their authority when they prioritize their own ends. For example, both 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Jim Jones are often viewed as charismatic leaders; however, 
while Dr. King is considered to be a moral leader, Jones, on account of his abuse of 
power, his manipulation of followers, and his detrimental effect on them, is justifiably 
deemed. unethical. Similar to the contingencies of Bass and Steidhneier's theory of 
authentic transformational leadership, charismatic leadership is considered ethical, or 
"authentic," when performed to benefit followers' interests, 
Commenting on ethical leadership, Rabinda N. Kanungo and Manuel Mendoca 
define leadership as the dynamic relationship between leaders and followers. In Ethical 
Dimensions of Leadership, they assert the necessity of altruistic leader motivation: 
Our thesis is that organizational leaders are truly effective only when they are 
motivated by a concern for others, when their actions are invariably guided 
primarily by the criteria of 'the benefit to others even if it results in some cost to 
self.' The underlying rationale or purpose for having a leader in a group or an 
organization is to move it toward the pursuit of objectives that, when attained, 
would produce benefits to both the organization and its members. Because the 
•other' - that is, the organization and its members- is the raison d'etre ofthe 
leader's efforts, the altruistic motive becomes the only consistent motive for the 
leader role. Therefore, leadership effectiveness is ensured only by altn1istic acts 
that reflect the leader's incessant desire and concern to benefit others despite the 
risk of personal cost inherent in such acts. (35) 
Kanungo and Mendoca•s perspective represents an explicit demand for altruistic 
motivation in leaders. This requirement is derived from their belief in the other-oriented 
objective of leadership. Similar to several political thinkers' conceptions that the 
col1ective legitimizes leadership through a social contract, Kanungo and Mendoca claim 
that leadership exists because of "the other" and, therefore, for its benefit. Thus, they 
adhere to the trend in historical political philosophy and modern leadership scholarship 
that conceptualizes leadership as primarily concerned with followers' interests, as 
intended to serve their ends, and as morally justified by its other-oriented purpose. 
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Chapter Two: Utilitarianism and its inadequate concern for the individual 
This chapter begins with a basic explanation of the moral philosophy of 
utilitarianism, with particular attention to its foundational principles relevant to this 
discussion of ethical service. The second section outlines utilitarianism's specific 
implications for service action. The chapter ends with a discussion of the basic criticism 
of utilitarianism; namely, that the utilitarian standard represents inadequate concern for 
the individual. As part of this criticism, I argue against utilitarianism's requirement that 
individuals give no special consideration to their own interests. 
Relevant Foundational Principles of Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism advocates a consequentialist approach to ethics. It proposes that the 
value of an action is determined by its outcome. Specifically, an action's moral value is 
grounded in the action's production of happiness. John Stuart Mill, in his treatise entitled 
Utilitarianism, writes, "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' or 
the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness; wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness" (10). 
Utilitarian philosophy argues that actions ought to be pursued based on the amount of 
happiness that they will produce. In comparing the ethical value of two separate actions, 
the action which produces the greater amount of happiness is considered to be of higher 
moral worth. Utilitarianism requires that in all instances, utility, in terms of happiness, be 
maximized. This means that, given the choice between two potential actions, an 
individual, in order to act ethically, must pursue the option in which greater happiness is 
produced as a result of the performed action. 
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It is important to note several characteristics of Mill's treatment of happiness. 
First, Mill thinks of happiness as an impersonal good. He makes no distinction between 
the value of one's personal happiness and the happiness of another. As a result, each 
individual's happiness receives equal, impartial consideration. Second, happiness is 
judged on a cumulative scale. Commenting on the effects of these two requirements, Mi11 
writes that the utilitarian standard "is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the 
greatest amount of happiness altogether'' (15-16). As revealed in this quote, the 
quantitative value of happiness affects an action's moral worth. Third, Mill judges 
happiness in tenns of quality as well as quantity. As far as the qualitative value of 
happiness, Mill distinguishes higher pleasures from lower ones. He maintains that higher 
pleasures, such as intellectual inquiry and healthy exercise, grant an individual more 
happiness than do lower pleasures, which include the corresponding activities of 
academic indifference and indulgent drinking. Consequently, Mill values actions in terms 
of the nature of the happiness they cause in the affected individuals. 
As a consequentialist philosophy, utilitarianism does not consider the motivation 
for action to be of moral significance in its evaluation of ethical behavior. As long as an 
action's outcome represents the maximization of utility in that given case, the action is 
moral regardless of the motivation which inspired the action. In other words, motivation 
does not enter the utilitarian scheme for justifying ethical action. Mill writes: 
Utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the 
motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the 
worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is 
morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his 
trouble. (148) 
Mill distinguishes utilitarianism as a guide for moral action from moral judgments on 
human beings themselves. Focused on the outcome of actions, utilitarianism allows for 
ethical action to be inspired by any form of motivation. As far as the utilitarian is 
concerned, motivation, whether altruistic or self-interested, does not affect the 
determination of an action's ethical value. 
Utilitarianism 's Implications for Service Action 
Utilitarianism does not make service, defined as particular long-term 
commitments of public assistance, an explicit moral requirement. However, one 
implication of the utilitarian philosophy is that service is often understood as required 
ethical action. This implication exists for several reasons. First, serving others can be 
morally required, because service generally acts as a means to increase the happiness of 
others and, therefore, overall happiness. Theoretically, to serve others is to produce 
benefit for them, and this benefit translates into an increased happiness. Second. as 
opposed to mandating a general increase of happiness, according to utilitarianism, one 
has a moral obligation to maximize happiness. As noted earlier, the targeted beneficiaries 
of service are those individuals with the greatest amount of need in society. The 
maximization of overall happiness is often assured by helping the least well-off people in 
a society, since they have the most to gain and thus get more utility from the service than 
someone who doesn't need such help. For example, giving five dollars to a homeless man 
gives him substantially greater happiness than giving five dollars to a millionaire. This 
represents the concept of diminishing marginal utility for income. Third, utilitarianism's 
potential service requirement is also strengthened by its foundational principle that 
happiness be evaluated on an impersonal, collective scale. Self-interested action, action 
which produces benefit for oneself, is not assigned any special value, since one's own 
benefit is treated as equally important as the benefit of another. Mill affirms this 
conclusion: 
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The utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own 
happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of 
others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and 
benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the 
complete spirit of the ethics of utility. 'To do as you would be done by,' and 'to 
love your neighbor as yourself,' constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian 
morality. (22) 
In this passage, Mill invokes Jesus' teachings to reveal how the principles of 
utilitarianism are exercised through altruistic practices. He promotes service action which 
benefits others as morally responsible behavior. 
Therefore, utilitarianism argues that, when the servant can maximize overall 
benefit by promoting the happiness of others, he morally ought to do so. However, 
utilitarianism would not assume that the interests of the individuals being served are 
always prioritized over the interests of the servant. The utilitarian philosophy does 
sometimes allow for the interests of servants to be pursued in ethical action based on the 
standard of maximizing utility. For example, the utilitarian perspective requires that when 
a servant can promote his own happiness, as part of maximizing the sum total of overall 
happiness, he is morally required to do so. Remaining within a purely consequentialist 
justification for action, the servant's attention to his personal interests in service action is 
not just permissible but is actually required, since it may be the most effective manner to 
guarantee that happiness, still valued impersonally, is maximized. The argument for 
service in which servants ethically pursue their own benefit is based on the cognitive 
contingency that allows them to maximize utility by giving the most attention to their 
own interests. It implies that individuals in fact are not truly impartial agents, but are 
cognitively partial to themselves. Since an individual knows what happiness is for 
himself better than what happiness is for another person, or other people, seivice that 
prioritizes the servant's interests may most effectively produce overall happiness, still 
valued on an impersonal scale. In this argument, one's cognitive bias allows for 
motivational partiality. For the servant, this means that, because he has greater 
knowledge of his own interests, in relation to the interests of others, he is justifiably 
allowed to prioritize his own interests in service and, in tenns of motivation, be self-
interested. This rationalization of a self-interested prioritization of ends depends upon the 
recognition of one's ends as one's own. It also reflects the idea that an individual may be 
more easily motivated by his own happiness than the happiness of others. 
Although utilitarianism offers a consequentialist approach to evaluating ethical 
action that appears as though it would support an argument for servants to prioritize their 
personal interests in service, its promotion of self-interested action has to be limited to 
ordinary, daily affairs. Based on utilitarian standards, only in those instances when 
prioritizing the servant's interests assures that overall happiness will be maximized is the 
servant's self-prioritization justified. In service activities, this case is highly unlikely, 
given that the benefit the servant gains through service is generally not greater, 
quantitatively and qualitatively, than the benefit which those individuals being served 
receive as a result of service. The great need of others ensures that a servant can almost 
always do more to maximize utility by pursuing others' interests in service. Therefore, 
utilitarianism most often promotes the traditional perspective on ethical service; namely, 
that service aim to produce benefit for others. This conclusion is based upon 
utilitarianism's impartial treatment of happiness whic is calculated on a cumulative scale 
that disregards distributional details. 
At times, utilitarianism's maximization of cumulative happiness requires that a 
relatively smaller amount of happiness be sacrificed in order to secure an overall greater 
amount of happiness. If the benefits that a servant produces for another individual, or 
other individuals, in service outweigh the costs incurred by the servant as a result of 
service, utilitarianism views this cost as justified, and the service, along with the servant's 
sacrifice, is required. Military service exemplifies this principle. Soldiers sacrifice 
themselves personally in order for the rest of the nation to remain safe. Their potential 
loss of life is justified by the relatively greater security and happiness that it grants the 
rest of society. In this way, utilitarianism justifies the individual's self-sacrifice on 
account of the good it produces for others. This sacrifice occurs in cases in which service 
cannot produce benefit for both parties of the service relationship. When mutual benefit is 
impossible and one party's interests have to be prioritized in service, the philosophy of 
utilitarianism, as has been noted above, would preference the interests of the individuals 
being served in nearly all cases, because these individuals are likely greater in number 
and greater in need. 
In his conception of moral duties, philosopher Peter Singer takes the utilitarian 
standard to its logical extreme. In an article entitled "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 
Singer proposes that, "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do 
it" (231). This means that, in the case of service, as long as servants, while producing 
benefits for others, do not reduce themselves, the servants, to a point of existence below 
that of the individuals whom they are serving, the service, and whatever sacrifice it 
includes, is required. In Singer's words: 
35 
It follows that I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much 
as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would 
begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's dependents - perhaps even 
beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving more one 
would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would 
prevent. (234) 
For Singer, those instances of giving which are generally viewed as charitable, 
meritorious acts are actually required moral duties. Although Singer's conception of 
moral duties appears extreme, his logic merely follows utilitarianism's foundational 
principles . Singer's conclusion that a servant's sacrifice of her personal standard ofliving 
to a point equal to that of the individuals being served is justified by traditional utilitarian 
principles which demand that individuals maximize utility according to an impartial 
treatment of happiness that is considered on a cumulative scale. 
With respect to motivation, utilitarianism, as a consequentialist philosophy, does 
not consider the motivations of servants as relevant to the justification of ethical service. 
In theory, servants may be motivationally self-interested or other-interested and still 
perform ethical service action as long as utility is maximized. In contrast to standard 
views of ethical service, the good of others need not be the source of a servant's 
motivation. Thus, while utilitarianism recognizes the need to sacrifice one's own interests 
in order to produce the greatest amount of cumulative happiness, self-sacrifice is merely a 
condition of the action, not a determinant of its moral value. Mill writes, "The utilitarian 
morality does recognize in human beings the power to sacrifice their own greatest good 
for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that sacrifice is itself a good" (22). 
However, since utilitarian principles by and large demand that, in the case of service, 
others' interests ought to be prioritized over those of servants, it is likely that servants 
ought to be motivated by the interests of others as opposed to self-interest. 
Utilitarianism 's Inadequate Concern for the Individual 
The principal criticism of utilitarianism is that it does not show adequate concern 
for the individual. Mill reveals utilitarianism's implications for the individual: 
Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of 
nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the 
nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer 
deduction from the benefit. (16) 
As philosopher John Rawls argues, the utilitarian standard provides a morally inadequate 
guide for ethical action. In his Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that utilitarianism, due to 
its collective treatment of happiness, does not grant enough respect to individuals. He 
argues that the utilitarian philosophy disregards the separateness of individuals and the 
value of the agent's interests. Rawls writes that the requirement that "we are to accept the 
greater advantages of others as a sufficient reason for lower expectations over the course 
of our life ... is surely an extreme demand" (178). Rawls opposes utilitarianism's strict 
guide for action, since it often requires the individual to sacrifice his personal interests to 
those of others. He argues that utilitarian requirements for moral action do not 
sufficiently recognize an individual's ends as particular to himself, as separate from 
others' ends, and as worthy ofindividualized consideration. 
In Equality and Partiality, Thomas Nagel explains how utilitarianism's treatment 
of interests is unjustified. He argues against the collective consideration of individual's 
interests. Nagel writes: 
Concern for everyone has to be particularized: It must contain a separate and 
equal concern for each person's good. When we occupy the impersonal 
standpoint, our impartial concern for each person exists side by side with out 
impartial concern for every other person. These concerns should not be 
conglomerated. ( 66) 
The explanation of the impersonal perspective depends upon an individual's ability to 
imagine himself as another person. Yet, Nagel notes that there is a tension present in this 
explanation: by valuing each individual, egalitarianism requires us to value all 
individuals; however, if we value all individuals, we must also value each individual as 
an individual. Because each person's interests are being considered individually, we must 
logicalty assign value to the individual interests of each person. It is the individual 
interests that matter, and, as a result, they ought not to be viewed collectively. Even in the 
argument for egalitarian action, there remains an acknowledgement of the separateness of 
individuals. From this descriptive recognition, that individuals' interests are separate, it 
follows that normatively, there ought to be a consideration of those individual ends. 
In the context of service, utilitarianism refuses to let the servant consider his own 
interests as important to him personally and thus worthy of special consideration. As a 
result, utilitarianism demands too much concern for others' interests in its requirements 
for ethical action. Making individuals see others' ends as equally important as their own 
ends is an unjustified expectation for human beings. If these individual interests matter 
morally, they must retain their identity as individual interests. Moral theory must respect 
this starting point. Both Rawls and.Nagel agree that valuing individual interests requires 
that these interests as individual interests be seen as valuable as well. 
Although we, as moral theorists, have to see them this way for moral reasons, 
agents have conceptual reasons to value their own ends. An individual chooses his 
specific ends instead of other interests, because he sees them as more valuable for him. 
This has practical implications. Individuals cannot help but see their ends as more 
valuable than other ends, otherwise they most likely would have chosen these other ends 
to be their own. In this argument, the nature of what it is to have individual interests as 
personal, separate ends implies the normative rule for action. The individual is justified in 
pursuing his own ends. What is necessary to have ends as his own entails that he must see 
the pursuit of his own ends is justified. He cannot see himself treating the ends of others 
as equally valuable to him as his own ends, unless he understands the ends of others as 
his own ends. For us, as moral theorists, ought implies can. While we may require that 
individuals not impede the ends of others, requiring their positive action in pursuit of 
these impersonal ends to be equal to the effort that they exert in pursuing their own ends 
is too extreme. Individuals must be justified in pursuing their own ends. Service in which 
the servant prioritizes his own interests over the interests of others is justified through the 
rejection of utilitarianism's collective scale of valuing happiness. This rejection is 
possible, because, if one acknowledges that human beings are best regarded individually, 
it follows that they are constituted as separate entities with their own personal interests 
which cannot be completely disregarded. 
Chapter Three: Ethical egoism and its excessive self-interest 
This chapter begins with an explanation of the foundational principles of ethical 
egoism, for the most part, as they are articulated by Ayn Rand in her objectivist 
philosophy. A discussion of ethical egoism's implications for service action follows this 
introductory section. WhiJe·this moral philosophy justifiably allows the agent to pursue 
his own ends, ultimately, its strict requirement that uncompromising self-interest serve as 
the only principle for morality warrants critique. The chapter ends by presenting two 
common criticisms of ethical egoism. I ultimately agree with James Rachels' criticisms 
of ethical egoism; namely, that its self-interest is excessive and, therefore, cannot serve as 
an appropriate basis for moral action. 
Relevant Foundational Principles of Ethical Egoism 
In contrast to utilitarianism's standard of maximizing overall utility based on an 
impartial treatment of happiness, the philosophy of ethical egoism demands that 
individuals consider only their own ends. Specifically, ethical egoism holds that 
individuals must act in their self-interest in order for an action to be moral. They are 
encouraged to maximize utility for themselves personally. Describing the foundational 
principles of the philosophy, James Rachels writes in The Elements of Moral Philosophy: 
Ethical Egoism is the radical view that one's only duty is to promote one's own 
interests. According to Ethical Egoism, there is only one ultimate principle of 
conduct, the principle of self-interest, and this principle sums up all of one's 
natural duties and obligations. (77) 
Thus, the philosophy of ethical egoism does not merely allow for individuals to prioritize 
their own ends, but instead, requires that they act in order to produce benefit for 
themselves. It also expects not only that individuals achieve self-interested ends but also 
that they be motivated by self-interest. This agreement is not unreasonable, since, in 
action, the ends that an individual intends to achieve, for the most part, reflect a similar 
motivational desire. This parallel between the intended outcome of an action and the 
motivational desires of the actor appears throughout ethics literature. As established in 
the literature review, altruistic leader motivation usually accompanies prescriptions of 
leadership seen as justified by the good it causes for others. For the ethical egoist, the 
pursuit of completely self-interested ends logically coincides with self-interested 
motivation. 
The work of Ayn Rand represents the best articulation of ethical egoism's 
foundational principles. Explaining the grounding for the philosophy, Rand affirms the 
intrinsic value each individual has as a human being. In her classic novel, Atlas 
Shrugged, main character John Galt delivers a speech in which he summarizes the 
justification of objectivism, Rand's egoist philosophy. He states: 
Man's life, as required by his nature, is not the life of a mindless brute, of a 
looting thug or a mooching mystic, but the life of a thinking being - not life by 
means of force or fraud, but life by means of achievement - not survival at any 
price, since there's only one price that pays for man's survival: reason. 
Man's life is the standard of morality, but your own life is its purpose. If 
existence on earth is your goal, you must choose actions and values by the 
standard of that which is proper to man- for the purpose of preserving, fulfilling 
and enjoying the irreplaceable value which is your life. {1014) · 
In conceptualizing why individuals ought to prioritize their own ends, Rand assigns value 
to the rational nature of human beings. For Rand, the ability to think rationally requires 
that individuals fulfill their potential, as evidenced by her demand for achievement. 
Importantly, she understands achievement in strictly personal terms. She continues, 
"Every man - is an end in himself, he exists for his own sake, and the achievement of his 
own happiness is his highest moral purpose" (1014). 
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Rand has a specific vision of what constitutes the best moral life. Yet, in her 
presentation of self-interest as a general ethical standard, she does not detail which 
specific actions ought to bring individuals happiness. This would be a contradiction in the 
ethical egoism philosophy, since it maintains the utmost respect for the individual. 
Accordingly, the philosophy must let the individual define his or her own sense of 
happiness and achievement. It proposes that individuals make a subjective assessment of 
their own interests. These interests can vary as long as they are based on an objective 
rational standard. In an article entitled, "The Ethics of Emergencies," Rand articulates 
objectivism's principal rule for action, she writes: 
The rational principle of conduct is ... always act in accordance with the 
hierarchy of your values [italics added], and never sacrifice a greater value to a 
lesser one. This applies to all choices, including one's actions toward other men. 
It requires that one possess a defined hierarchy of rational values (values chosen 
and validated by a rational standard). (534) 
While she may specify that happiness can only be truly achieved when an individual acts 
in accordance with his values, which represents a loyalty to himself which she calls 
integrity, she does not define what those values ought to be for each individual, beyond 
that they be rational. For example, she would not presume to determine whether a 
successful acquisition accomplished by a dedicated capitalist entrepreneur is of more 
value than a news article published by a skilled writer. The moral value of each action is 
dependent upon the actor's system of values. As Rand illustrates through her various 
characters in her two classic novels, The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, while ethical 
egoism's standards for living the moral life are extremely high, achieving the good life 
can occur in many forms. For example, the CEO of the most successful railroad company 
based in New York City may be as ethical as the hamburger cook at a diner in the middle 
of the Rockies as long as their motivation to have these jobs and their successfulness, or 
achievement, in these roles adhere to their personal standard of values. 
Ethical Egoism's Implications for Service Action 
Unlike most moral philosophies, ethical egoism denies that human beings have a 
moral responsibility to others. As Rachels notes, with self-interest serving as the 
philosophy's determinant of ethical action, an individual's responsibilities are limited to 
those which concern himself. Regarding service action, ethical egoism would not 
promote service as it has been defined here. Understood as particular Iong-tenn 
commitments of public assistance, service generally aims to better society at large, often 
times, by helping its least well-off members. Service action in most cases consists of 
helping strangers for extended periods of time. Rand would not support service 
commitments even if the servant believes that serving others is in his self-interest and is 
aligned with his values. Rand would deem this servant irrational. She would argue that 
this servant has no values. For the ethical egoist, service action represents the substitution 
of others' values for one's own. Service entails the sacrifice of one's life, because the 
nature of service, as a long-term commitment of public assistance, does not allow one to 
pursue one's own values, interests, and ends. Rand argues that serving others represents 
the sacrifice of one's life, which, as one's highest value, is never justifiably sacrificed. 
Thus, ethical egoism rejects the standard view that moral service is justified by 
the good it causes for others. Rand defiantly opposes a code of morality in which the 
interests of others are prioritized. She calls this standard "a morality of sacrifice." Since 
one's own happiness is the purpose of one's life, valuing the interests of others more than 
one's own interests represents the sacrifice of a greater value to a lesser one. Therefore, 
Rand fervently opposes altruistic acts and especially denies that altruistic motivation 
justifies action. She writes: 
Altruism has destroyed the concept of any authentic benevolence or good will 
among men. It has indoctrinated men with the idea that to value another human 
being is an act of selflessness, thus implying that a man can have no personal 
interest in others - that to value another means to sacrifice oneself. (533). 
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In contrast to the selflessness fundamental to a morality of altruism, Rand believes that 
selfishness is necessary in moral relationships with others. She argues that love and 
friendship are only genuine when one selfishly values the other person. Explaining how 
selfishness is required for love and friendship to be authentic, Rand writes: 
Love and friendship are profoundly personal, selfish values: love is an expression and 
assertion of self-esteem, a response to one's own values in the person of another. One 
gains profoundly personal, selfish joy from the mere existence of the person one 
loves. It is one's personal, selfish happiness that one seeks, earns and derives from 
love. A 'selfless,' 'disinterested' love is a contradiction in terms; it means that one is 
indifferent to that which one values. (534). 
Although the requirement of selfishness in relationships in which one cares about another 
can appear contradictory, love and other intimate relationships are often times thought of 
as the investment of oneself in another person. For Rand, ethical individuals love 
themselves and their own values and love individuals with whom they share their values. 
Certainly, this understanding of required selfishness in moral relationships has 
implications for a discussion of ethical helping behavior. Since love and friendship must 
actually be selfish commitments in order for them to be genuine and moral, the welfare of 
an individual's loved ones is understood to be his own, selfish concern. As a result, when 
these loved ones are in need, he is required to help them. Rand writes: 
If one's friend is in trouble, one should act to help him by whatever nonsacrificial 
means are appropriate. For instance, if one's friend is starving, it is not a sacrifice, 
but an act of integrity to give him money for food rather than buy some 
significant gadget for oneself, because his welfare is important in the scale of 
one's personal values. If the gadget means more than the friend's suffering, one 
had no business pretending to be his friend. (535) 
Although the philosophy of ethical egoism does not prohibit helping behavior, the 
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justification for helping others remains conting~nt upon the values and desires of the 
helping individual. In Atlas Shrngged, Rand writes, "Do you ask if it's ever proper to 
help another man? No ~ if he claims it as his right or as a moral duty that you owe him. 
Yes - if such is your own desire based upon your own selfish pleasure in the value of his 
person and his struggle" (1059-1060). According to Rand, in order for helping acts to be 
ethical, the servant must desire to help individuals out ofrespect for and love of their 
values. 
Contrary to the general stance ethical egoism takes in regard to service, Rand 
acknowledges that there are some instances in which individuals are required to help 
strangers in need. These are in emergency cases, which she defines as "an unchosen, 
unexpected event, limited in time, that creates conditions under which human survival is 
impossible" (536). Importantly, emergency cases are temporary, and this distinguishes 
them from service action in which the social need is long-standing and the commitment is 
long-term. Rand gives the following two examples to show the distinction, she writes: 
It is only in emergency situations that one should volunteer to help strangers, if it 
is in one's power. For instance, a man who values human life and is caught in a 
shipwreck, should help to save his fellow passengers (though not at the expense of 
his own life). But this does not mean that after they all reach shore, he should 
devote his efforts to saving his fellow passengers from poverty, ignorance. 
neurosis or whatever other troubles they might have. Nor does it mean that he 
should spend his life sailing the seven seas in search of shipwreck victims to save. 
Or to take an example that can occur in everyday life : suppose one hears that the 
man next door is ill and penniless. Illness and poverty are not metaphysical 
emergencies. they are part of the normal risks of existence; but since the man is 
temporarily helpless, one may bring him food and medicine, if one can afford it 
(as an act of goodwill, not of duty) or one may raise a fund among the neighbors 
to help him out. But this does not mean that one must support him from then on, 
nor that one must spend one's life looking for starving men to help. (536) 
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Rand believes that an individual should help others in emergency situations out of respect 
for their human value, specifically their potential for rationality and achievement. 
Helping others in these cases reflects a servant's integrity to the moral value oflife. 
Therefore, from the ethical egoist perspective, there are several cases in which 
helping behavior is required ethical action. Two have been addressed: the case of loved 
ones in need and cases of strangers in emergencies. In order for an individual to maintain 
integrity to his hierarchy of rational values, he must help those individuals who have 
earned his respect. Emergency cases include the consideration for the well-being of 
strangers only on account of their potential value and in extreme situations of life and 
death. Ethical egoism allows for individuals to help others when they perceive that it is in 
their self-interest to help them. They understand that helping others helps them. The 
justification for this self-interested helping behavior is based upon a reciprocal, tit-for-tat 
understanding of helping. It is a consequentialist justification: I help you so that you help 
me. However, with regard to service, the long-term commitment to public benefit is both 
too long and too impersonal for the action to be justified. Rand would seem to suggest 
that service necessarily conflicts with an individual's pursuit of his own values. Rand 
writes, "In the normal conditions of existence, man has to choose his goals, project them 
in time, pursue them and achieve them by his own effort." (536). Ethical egoism, guided 
by the principle of self-interest, requires that ethical individuals value their own projects 
to the extent that they are never justifiably sacrificed to the interests of others. 
Two Criticisms of Ethical Egoism 
Ethical egoism's rejection of service depends upon Rand's strict view of the 
potential ethical values of action. She maintains that actions are either selfish or self-
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sacrificial. She does not allow for a compromise between these two possibilities. As 
James Rachels argues in The Elements of Moral Philosophy, this dichotomy for judging 
the nature of action represents an unqualified understanding of the moral value of action. 
He criticizes Rand's philosophy for being too radical and too rigid. Rachels writes: 
The problem with [Rand's] argument, as you may have already noticed, is that it 
relies on picturing the alternatives in such an extreme way. 'The ethics of 
altruism' is taken to be such an extreme philosophy that nobody, with the possible 
exception of certain monks, would find it congenial. As Ayn Rand presents it, 
altruism implies that one's own interests have no value, and that any demand by 
others calls for sacrificing them. If that is the alternative, then any other view, 
including Ethical Egoism, will look good by comparison. But this is hardly a fair 
picture of the choices. What we called the common-sense view stands somewhere 
between the two extremes. It says that one's own interests and the interests of 
others are both important and must be balanced against one another. Sometimes, 
when the balancing is done, it will tum out that one should act in the interests of 
others; other times, it will tum out that one should take care of oneself. (81-82) 
Rachels argues for a middle ground in ethical action. He proposes that one's interests 
ought to be valued as well as the interests of others so that an individual cannot only 
pursue his own self-interest but he must also pursue the interests of others. According to 
Rachels, morality demands a balance of one's own interests and others' interests. Rachels 
conceptualizes morality as being successfully enacted when one works for one's own 
benefit at certain times, and the benefit of others, at other times. 
However, Rand would respond that her interpretation of the two potential values 
of action is valid. Rand's strict dialectical framework for ethical action is grounded in 
understanding an individual's ends as his own and separate from others. She requires that 
individuals pursue their own ends. Therefore, any time that an individual pursues the 
ends of others, he is not pursuing his own ends, and therefore sacrifices himself to that 
extent. Rachels himself describes the nature of Rand's conception of self-sacrifice: 
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By 'sacrificing one's life' Rand does not necessarily mean anything so dramatic 
as dying. A person's life consists (in part) of projects undertaken and goods 
earned and created. To demand that a person abandon his projects or give up his 
goods is also a clear effort to 'sacrifice his life.'(80) 
Because an individual's own ends reflect his values, giving up these ends, if only 
temporarily, signifies the sacrifice of his life. As mentioned earlier, Rand would argue 
that a requirement of service is clearly a requirement that an individual sacrifice his own 
projects, and, thus, himself. She proposes that, in the moral code of altruism, individuals 
are either victims or parasites. Rand considers service action within this moral code of 
altruism so that servants are always victims, sacrificing their lives to others, and the 
individuals being served are always parasites, dependently feeding off the self-sacrifice 
of the servants. 
However, neither Rand nor Rachels account for the possibility that the servant can 
pursue both his own interests and the interests of others in service action. The extremity 
of Rand's view does not allow for a combination of interests to occur in any manner, and 
Rachels presents a balance where interests are pursued at different times. What he does 
not describe is the case in which the interests of both the servant and the individuals 
being serving are pursued at the same time. In these cases of service, the interests of the 
servant and those individuals being served are combined and therefore can be advanced 
at the same time. There are two possible ways in which servants and the individuals being 
served mutually benefit from service. In the first case, the servant receives the same 
direct benefit as the individuals being served. For example, in the civil rights movement, 
the African American leaders who helped secure greater personal rights for their 
followers received the same direct benefits as the individuals whom they served. In the 
second case, the servant receives a different, indirect benefit from service that still 
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produces benefit for others. One example of this type of benefit is the psychological and 
emotional satisfactions that a servant feels as a result of serving others. These 
satisfactions were mentioned previously and include a sense of accomplishment, a feeling 
of belonging, and an affirmation of purpose (Coles, Ch. 3). As articulated in the 
introduction, today's society respects and encourages service commitments to the degree 
that serving others provides another type of indirect benefit for the servant. Through 
performing service, a s~ant can strengthen his professional experience and self-
presentation, and, as a result, receive future benefits, such as a new job or higher wages. 
However, ethical egoism is still left with the objection that it does not justify why 
an individual can preference his own ends over the ends of others. The philosophy does 
not provide an adequate explanation as to why one's own ends are of higher value than 
another's ends beyond the justification that they are one's own ends. Articulating why the 
ends of others ought to be considered, Rachels compares ethical egoism's singular 
concern with one's own ends to systems of arbitrary preference and discrimination such 
as racism. His argument against these systems begins with the premise that "any moral 
doctrine that assigns greater importance to the interests of one group than to those of 
another is unacceptably arbitrary unless there is some difference between the members of 
the groups that justifies treating them differently" (89). According to this statement, it 
appears as though Rachels allows for greater importance to be assigned to a group's, or 
theoretically, an individual's, ends as long as the reason for the distinction is not 
arbitrary. However, Rachels argues that there is not a legitimate difference between 
persons that justifies an individual assigning greater importance to his own interests than 
the interests of others. He writes: 
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Ethical egoism would have each person assign greater importance to his of her 
own interests than to the interests of others. But there is no general difference 
between oneself and others, to which each person can appeal, that justifies this 
difference in treatment. Therefore, ethical egoism is unacceptably arbitrary. (89) 
By not respecting others' ends, ethical egoism does not provide an adequate account of 
one's moral duties to others. Ethical egoism promotes a system of values and ethics that 
represent too much concern for oneself in action. The dignity embedded in oneself, which 
justifies being concerned with·one's own ends, does not legitimize the complete disregard 
of others' ends. Instead, as Rachels affirms, "We should care about the interest of other 
people for the very same reason we care about our own interests; for their needs and 
desires are comparable to our own'' (89). While this likeness shows how others' interests 
cannot be ignored, their interests cannot be viewed as the agent's own interests. 
Chapter Four: Kantianism and its moral duties to others and agents 
The final chapter on philosophical traditions begins with a basic explanation of 
the foundational principles ofKantianism. It next outlines the moral philosophy's 
implications for service action based on Kant's moral duty to help others. The final 
section of this chapter presents two respected philosopher's interpretations of Kant's 
treatment of moral duties. The first philosopher, Susan Wolf, raises questions about 
Kant's duties to others; the second philosopher, Thomas Hill, argues in support of Kant's 
duties to oneself, indirectly disputing Wolfs claims. Kant's treatment of agent's duties is 
crucial to the justification of my theory of ethical service. Through a reasoned line of 
argument, I articulate how a non-arbitrary difference between one's own ends and those 
of others actually grounds the duty we have to value the ends of others, and I ultimately 
show how this distinction justifies the servant's prioritization of his interests in service. 
Relevant Foundational Principles of Kantianism 
Kantianism refers to the moral system of thought conceived by arguably the 
greatest modern moral philosopher, Immanuel Kant. The foundational principles for 
action in Kantianism rest on the fo11owing two central beliefs. First, Kant supposes that 
the only unqualified good is the good will. Second, he proposes that reason is the only 
way to establish a good will. Based on these two grounds, Kant maintains that reason is 
the only source of moral motivation and that adherence to reason serves as the universal 
requirement for moral action. In his treatise, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant explains why the will, or intention in action, is of singular ethical significance: 
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it and 
so too does not lie in any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from 
this expected effect. For all these effects, (agreeableness of one's condition, 
indeed even promotion of others' happiness) could have been brought on by other 
causes, so that there would have been no need, for this, of the will of a rational 
being, in which, however the highest and unconditional good alone can be found. 
Hence nothing other than the representation of the law in itself, which can of 
course occur only in a rational being, insofar as it and not the hoped-for effect is 
the determining ground of the will, can constitute the preeminent good we call 
moral. (14) 
Kant concludes that only the good will is of intrinsic moral value, since all other things 
are good conditionally. However, the will is only good when determined by reason. 
Noting the distinction between his understanding of the purpose of reason and common 
interpretations of its effects, Kant writes, "But as much as reason has been imparted to us 
as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will, its true function 
must be to produce a will which is not merely good as a means to some further end, but is 
good itself' (97). 
Kant distinguishes his deontological theory from consequentialist philosophies 
that view the production of happiness to be of ultimate moral worth. He explains how the 
alignment of one's will with reason remains the only possible good, yet it does not 
necessarily lead to happiness: 
This will need not ... be the sole and complete good, but it must still be the 
highest good and the condition of every other, even of all the demands for 
happiness. In this case it is entirely consistent with the wisdom of nature ifwe 
perceive that the cultivation of reason, which is requisite to the first and 
unconditioned purpose, may in many ways restrict - at least in this life- the 
attainment of the second, namely happiness, which is always conditional; indeed 
it may reduce it below zero without nature proceeding unpurposively in the 
matter, because reason, which cognizes its highest practical vocation in the 
establishment of a good will, in attaining this purpose is capable only of its own 
kind of satisfaction, namely from fulfilling an end which in tum only reason 
determines, even if this should be combined with many infringements upon the 
ends of inclination. (10) 
In the evaluation of ethical action, moral weight is thus assigned to the nature of an 
individual's intention. Kant proposes that actions are moral when the intention is 
grounded in reason and not in the foreseen outcome of the action. An action has moral 
value only when an individual acts out of duty to reason as defined by reason. 
According to Kantianism, the rational aligning of individuals' wills, out of a 
respect for reason itself and individuals' rationality, acts as the principle guideline for 
moral action. Kant's rules for action emerge in two distinct forms according to the nature 
of the reason which motivates them. Using Kant's tenns, there are both hypothetical and 
categorical reasons for action. Hypothetical reasons apply to those actions undertaken to 
obtain a desired good which ought to follow from them. For example, if one wants to be a 
doctor, then one rationally must will the extra years of higher education. In contrast, 
categorical reasons for action support action that is necessary in itself. Kant argues for the 
universality of all moral behavior, as pronounced in his first categorical imperative: "I 
ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law" (15). Kant's universal laws for action assure that each individual 
is held to the similar standard. 
From the first categorical imperative, basic moral duties are delineated. In 
Kantian philosophy, there are two types of duties: strict duties and broad duties. 
Assessing duties as strict signifies that they must always be followed. Suicide and lying 
represent two examples. Kant requires that individuals tell the truth, because lying 
reflects a "contradiction in conception." This means that in a world where everyone lies, 
there is no incentive to lie, because there would be no telling the truth and no expectation 
that anyone would do so. In contrast, Kant's conception of broad duties includes actions 
which if not undertaken represent a "contradiction in will." Kant's two examples of this 
kind of duty are developing one's talents and helping others in need. The duty to develop 
one's talents is required, because to will a world in which no one developed their talents 
would be a contradiction, which reason does not allow. The requirements placed on these 
duties are not as stringent as those assigned to strict duties; as a result, individuals are 
granted greater liberty in the fulfillment of these duties. 
Kantianism 's Implications for Service Action 
Kant proposes that individuals have a broad duty to help others in need. Helping 
action is required, because we all need the help of others, and, thus will their help. To 
will a world in which noone helped others would be a contradiction, which reason does 
not allow. Kant presents the fo11owing example to characterize the duty to help others: 
A fourth [man,] for whom things are going well while he sees that others (whom 
he could very well help) have to contend with great hardships, thinks: what is it to 
me? let each be as happy as heaven wills or as he can make himself; I shall take 
nothing from him nor even envy him; only I do not care to contribute anything to 
his wellfare or to his assistance when in need! Now, if such a way of thinking 
were to become a universal law of nature the human race could admittedly very 
well subsist ... but although it is possible that a universal law of nature could 
very well subsist in accordance with such a maxim, it is still impossible to will 
that such a principle hold everywhere as a law of nature. For, a will that decided 
this would conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which one would 
need the love and sympathy of others and in which, by such a law of nature arisen 
from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes 
for himself. (33) 
Kant thus substantiates the requirement to help others, because reason mandates that, if 
individuals desire to receive aid from others in times of need, they must adhere to a 
standard of action in which all individuals are required to help others. If an individual 
says that he won't help others, in Kant's moral theory, he is willing that no one help 
anyone. The universalization of ethical action means that individuals do not help others 
for practicality's sake, meaning that they help others in order to receive help later. This 
would represent a tit-for-tat, reciprocal justification of the duty to help others. Instead, an 
individual is rationally required to help others. If she wills that another individual help 
her, it would be a contradiction in reason to refuse to help others. 
Kant's second categorical imperative also contributes to one's duty to help others. 
It states, "Act [in such a way] that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" 
(38). This originates from Kant's belief in the shared, equal dignity of human beings. 
Kant argues that individuals cannot merely be treated as instruments for the betterment of 
others. This would mean treating them as things instead of persons. Kant believes that 
individuals have intrinsic value, because they are capable of aligning their wills with 
rationality. The second categorical imperative has implications for how helping action 
ought to be performed. Regarding what constitutes a moral motivation to help others, 
Kant argues that neither altruistic nor self-interested motivation constitutes an ethical 
reason to help others. histead, helping acts have moral value only when a person 
acknowledges her duty to help others out respect for their rationality, which is demanded 
by reason itself. Kant therefore requires a sense of heightened self-consciousness in the 
helping individual as to why she is providing help to others: she must acknowledge that it 
is her duty to help others because reason dictates that helping others is a moral duty. 
Although Kant requires individuals help others as a broad, meritorious duty, he 
does not explicitly consider the specific form of helping behavior which service, 
understood as particular long-term commitments of public assistance, represents. 
However, there is the potential to view service an integral component of Kant's broad 
duty to help others. The duty to serve others is supported by Kant's requirement that 
individuals, at times, make the ends of others their own ends. Kant writes: 
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Concerning [the] meritorious duty to others, the natm::al end that all human beings 
have is their own happiness. Now, humanity might indeed subsist if no one 
contributed to the happiness of others but yet did not intentionally withdraw 
anything from it; but there is still only a negative and not a positive agreement 
with humanity as an end in itself unless everyone also tries, as far as he can, to 
further the ends of others. For, the ends of a subject who is an end in itself must as 
far as possible be also my ends, if that representation is to have its full effect in 
me. (39) 
In this explanation, Kant justifies the duty to help others by requiring that individuals 
view the ends of others as their own on account of the equal dignity of human beings. 
This interpretation assumes that an individual pursues the ends of others as if those ends 
are her own, since reason dictates that they are equally valuable to her own ends. Given 
this condition, serving others is perhaps the most practical means to fulfill one's duty to 
help others, because the long-term dedication which service requires allows for servants 
to view the ends of others as their own ends to an extent that other, temporary forms of 
helping behavior may not permit. In this interpretation of Kant's duty to others, it appears 
that the servant at times is required to substitute the ends of others for her own ends. As 
has been previously discussed, this substitution implies a sacrifice of one's own ends. 
Derived from Kant's duty to help others, service is understood as a moral duty which not 
only includes, but also requires, the sacrifice of servants' ends. 
Two Philosophical Interpretations of Kant's Moral Duties 
Philosopher Susan Wolf, in an article entitled, "Moral Saints," argues that 
Kantianism requires this sacrifice of servants' ends. She proposes that a strict adherence 
to Kant's moral duties can lead to individuals working to benefit only others, whlch does 
not represent ethically responsible behavior. She uses the term "moral saint" to refer to 
individuals who strictly adhere to moral rules for action. Describing the repercussion of 
such a dedication to morality, she writes, "A necessary condition of moral sainthood 
would be that one's life be dominated by a commitment to improving the welfare of 
others or of society as a whole" (31 ). She describes two types of moral saints - the 
Loving Saint and the Rational Saint. The Loving Saint represents the individual who 
adheres to utilitarian moral standards and works to promote the good of others, because 
this makes him happy. Wolf writes, "[His happiness] truly lies in the happiness of others, 
and so he would devote himself to others gladly, and with a whole and open heart" (31 ). 
In contrast, the Rational Saint serves others out of a sense of duty. The Rational Saint 
represents the individual dedicated to Kant's conception of moral duties. Wolf writes, 
"He pays little or no attention to his own happiness in light of the overriding importance 
he gives to the wider concerns of morality" (31). Wolf criticizes Kant's system of 
morality. She argues that its code of ethics can result in an individual's loss of self-
interest and the justified pursuit of his own ends. 
Wolf is right to conclude that to aim to benefit only others and not oneself is 
unjustified. She writes: 
The ideal of a life of moral sainthood disturbs not simply because it is an ideal of 
a life in which morality unduly dominates. The normal person's direct and 
specific desires for objects, activities, and events that conflict with the attainment 
of moral perfection are not simply sacrificed but removed, suppressed, or 
subsumed. The way in which morality, unlike other possible goals, is apt to 
dominate is particularly, disturbing, for it seems to require either the lack or the 
denial of the existence of an identifiable, personal self. (35) 
In addition, Wolf is correct in estimating the limitations which result from a life 
dedicated to improving the welfare of others instead of one's own. Wolf believes that the 
Rational Saint, in constantly adhering to morality's rational duties, likely loses the ability 
to benefit others by not being self-interested. Since moral saints end up furthering others' 
ends instead of their own, they do not develop the excellent skills or attributes they need 
to help others. This argument proposes that solely working for the ends of others is self-
defeating or counter-productive. She continues to support her argument against a singular 
dedication to the ends of others, by noting how an individual's successful personal 
development is generally respected and valued: 
The feats of Groucho Marx, Reggie Jackson, and head chef at Lutece are 
impressive accomplishments that it is not only permissible but positively 
appropriate to recognize as such. In general, the admiration of and striving toward 
achieving any of a variety of forms of personal excellence are character traits it is 
valuable and desirable for people to have. In advocating the development of these 
varieties of excellence, we advocate nonmoral reasons for acting, and in thinking 
that it is good for a person to strive for an ideal that gives a substantial value to 
the interests and values that correspond to these virtues, we implicitly 
acknowledge the goodness of ideals incompatible with that of the moral saint. 
Finally, if we think that it is as good, or even better for a person to strive for one 
of these ideals than it is for him or her to strive for and realize the ideal of the 
moral saint, we express a conviction that it is good not to be a moral saint. (?). 
Thus, the Rational Saint's lack of self-interest is ethically unacceptable from an intrinsic 
standpoint. Self-development is valuable in itself. Wolf justifiably argues that it is right 
for people to pursue their own interests. While Wolf is right about several moral issues, 
she remains wrong about Kant's disregard for an individual's duty to herself. 
Philosopher Thomas Hill, in an article entitled, "Servility and Self-Respect," 
shows how Kant, instead of promoting self-sacrificial duties, requires that individuals 
view their own ends as equal to the ends of others. Hill first questions the morality of 
servile behavior. In order to communicate the specifics of his conception of servility, Hill 
constructs three examples of characters displaying stereotypical servile behavior: the 
Uncle Tom figure, the Self-Deprecator, and the Deferential Wife. The Uncle Tom figure 
works in deference to another individual, because social prejudices have corrupted his 
sense of self-worth, and as Hill writes, "he does not feel that he has the right to expect 
anything better" (5). While the Self-Deprecator correctly assesses his personal flaws, he 
does not understand that his character deficiencies do not undermine his personal value. 
The Deferential Wife subordinates her interests to those of her husband, because 
fulfilling his wants makes her happy. Hill notes the flaw in her behavior in that "she tends 
not to form her own interests, values, and ideals; and, when she does, she counts them as 
less important than her husband's" (5). Shown in the specificity of his examples, Hill's 
construction of servility does not apply to all forms of helping behavior. He believes that 
individuals can justifiably work to produce benefit for another person without necessarily 
being servile. He defines servility as "a kind of deferential attitude towards others 
resulting from ignorance or misunderstanding of one's moral rights" (1 O}. 
From this understanding of servility, Hill then argues that such servile behavior 
conflicts with a person's required level of self-respect. He proposes that those individuals 
acting in service to another out of perverted notions of personal rights or values are acting 
immorally. He writes, "To avoid servility to the extent that one can is not simply a right 
but a duty, not simply a duty to others but a duty to oneself' (4). He supports this thesis 
with both utilitarian and deontological justifications; however Hill maintains that 
justifying the immorality of servile behavior in utilitarian terms fails to address the 
intrinsic violations such behavior represents to an individual's self-respect. If one moves 
outside the realm of utilitarian justification and looks at instances of self-sacrificial 
service in terms of deontological values, the weight of the outcome is disregarded. 
Instead, the action is judged by its intrinsic worth. Hill writes: 
When a person's happiness stems from a morally objectionable attitude, it ought 
to be discounted. That the sadist gets pleasure from seeing others suffer should 
not count even as a partial justification for his attitude. That a servile person 
derives pleasure from denying her moral status, for similar reasons, cannot make 
her attitude acceptable. (7} 
Hill affinns that it is inherently wrong for an individual to sacrifice her personal ends. To 
work solely for the ends of others signifies that an individual lacks appropriate 
understanding of her own rights and a required sense of self-respect as far as fulfilling her 
duties to herself is concerned. 
Hill argues that the requirement of self-respect must be grounded in a universal 
attribute of human beings. He writes, "The capacities of different persons vary widely; 
but what the servile person seems to overlook is something by virtue of which he is equal 
with every other person" (9). The servile individual disrespects his moral rights. 
Examining the three cases of servile behavior, Hill concludes that "the objectionable 
feature is ... a willingness to disavow one's moral status, publicly and systematically, in 
the absence of any strong reason to do so.'' (12). The cases exemplify the immorality of 
inadequately respecting oneself. The servile individuals fail to fulfill their moral duty to 
themselves. Using a Kantian perspective on one's moral duties to oneself, Hill explains 
the crux of his argument: 
The objection to the servile person, given our premises, is that he does not satisfy 
the basic requirement to respect morality. A person who fully respected a system 
of moral rights would be disposed to learn his proper place in it, to affirm it 
proudly, and not to tolerate abuses of it lightly. This is just the sort of disposition 
that the servile person lacks ... The servile person, as such, does not express 
disrespect for the system of moral rights in the obvious way by violating the rights 
of others. His lack of respect is more subtly manifested by his acting before others 
as ifhe did not know or care about his position of equality under that system. (14) 
Hill proposes that servile behavior violates one's moral duty, because morality, founded 
upon equal assessment of human beings' individual value, demands that people treat 
themselves with equal respect as they treat others. The philosophy is egalitarian. It aims 
to redress the conditions that servility encourages in which the servant places himself 
below those individuals he serves. Importantly, Hill understands that the moral duty to 
oneself implies the requirement of benefiting oneself. Hill writes: 
Clearly a duty to avoid servility would be a duty to oneself at least in this minimal 
sense, for it is a duty to avoid, so far as possible, the denial of one's moral status. 
The duty is concerned with understanding and affirming one's rights, which are, 
at least as a rule, for one's own benefit. (16) 
In Hill's argument, benefit is construed as granting oneself equal rights to the rights 
which one grants to others. In this interpretation of Kant's moral duties, one's own ends 
matter as much as the ends of others so that individuals are required to act in ways in 
which they do not ignore or disrespect their own ends. 
In the context of service, this requirement has important implications for the 
duties of the servant. According to Hill's belief in required self-respect, service 
committed without the morally appropriate self-respect would contain a similar 
misunderstanding of, or undervaluing of, the servant's rights, or agency. In the case of 
service, the servant has the moral duty to herself to not engage in any service activities in 
which she would, in Hill's terms, disrespect her moral status through servile behavior, or, 
in Wolfs perspective, commit herself to work for only the ends of others. What has not 
been appreciated in these interpretations of Kant's moral standards for helping others is 
the possibility that in service, the servant maintains self-respect for her own ends only by 
prioritizing these ends. In this conception, the servant ought to promote her personal ends 
in performing service so that she is not disrespecting her moral worth as a moral agent. 
An Argument for the Servant 's Prioritization of her own ends in Service 
While Kant generally evaluates one's own good to be of equal importance to the 
good of others, Kant's derivation of the duty to help others prioritizes the individual 
interests of the person who is required to help. He grounds the requirement for helping 
action in the understanding that if one wills to benefit from others in the pursuit and 
successful advancement of one's own ends, then one must, at times, serve others in order 
to uphold the willed universal law of action. Conceptually, one's own ends are the 
starting point of the argument. Underneath the egalitarian standard of universality, there 
thus remains a degree of required self-prioritization. Notice, for example, that in 
articulating the reason for a broad duty to help others, Kant writes, "For, the ends of a 
subject who is an end in itself must as far as possible be also my ends, if that 
representation is to have its full effect in me" (39, emphasis added). This means that, in 
developing the moral imperative of service, one must do justice to the conceptual 
prioritization of one's personal ends. Kant maintains that only through the 
acknowledgement of an individual's own ends and her desire to achieve those ends 
through the help of others must she understand service as a required universal action. The 
reason that we must help others with their ends, although it ultimately is grounded in 
reason itself dictating that it is rational to do so, originates in our own desires to achieve 
our own ends. Kant's qualifier "as far as possible" affirms that rationally there are 
circumstances in which we cannot see others' ends as our own. 
This means that the distinction between one's own ends and the ends of others is 
not arbitrary; instead, preferring one's own ends is completely rational. Kant reveals the 
conceptual prioritization of the agent's ends in his statement that the agent ought to see 
others' ends as his own only "as far as possible" (39). This indicates that an agent may 
not ethically be able to see others' ends as her own, for seeing others' ends as her own 
would not allow her to pursue her own ends. Kant argues that an individual has to pursue 
her own ends, because, since she has willed her own ends, it would be a contradiction in 
will not to pursue them and instead pursue others' ends. Kant, in using the phrase "as far 
as possible," does not permit an individual to see others' ends as her own. Even seeing 
others' ends as equal to one's own undennines her ability to pursue her own ends, unless 
these ends are shared. Based on Kant's derivation of the moral duty to help others, in 
which one's own ends are conceptually prioritized, and based on the view that one's 
ability to view others' ends as one's own is not only limited but also unethical, the 
servant's prioritization of her own ends in the perfonnance of service is justified. The 
logical consequence of this argument is that ethical service requires that servants and the 
individuals being served have shared ends. 
Chapter Five: Implications of this theory of ethical service 
While service fundamentally aims to produce substantial social benefit for others, 
this other-oriented objective does not justify disregarding the servant's interests. I argue 
that, for service to be justified, it must be the case not only that the benefits outweigh 
the costs for the individuals being served but also that the benefits outweigh the 
costs for the servant. This theory of ethical service is egalitarian in that it requires that 
service produce overall benefit for both the servant and the individuals being served. The 
servant's interests cannot be ethically sacrificed to the interests of others. The 
justification for this argument is grounded in Kant's duty to oneself. As shown in the last 
chapter, he requires that individuals pursue their own ends. Pursuing others' ends instead 
of one's own ends would constitute a lack of self-respect and a violation of one's moral 
duty to oneself. It would also undermine the grounding of the duty to help others in need. 
So, this theory of ethical service moves beyond the egalitarianism justification and 
demands that servants prioritize their own interests in service. This prioritization does not 
signify that the servant grants more moral weight to his own interests than the interests of 
others; instead, it means that the servant must put her ends ahead of the ends of some, but 
not all, other individuals. In other words, in serving others, the servant has to help others 
in the pursuit of their ends, but her own ends get put first, allowing her to choose whom 
to help. She prioritizes her interests in the selection of service. Since service action is 
justified by the benefit it produces for servants and the individuals being served, servants 
ought to pursue service actions only when they anticipate the benefits for them will 
outweigh the costs. Servants therefore ought to choose particular fonns of service which 
align with their interests. 
There is a crucial conceptual connection between pursuing one's own ends, which 
Kant understands as one's goals or projects, and prioritizing one's interests, which 
generally refers to one's desires, needs, or preferences. This connection is best viewed as 
a reciprocal relationship in which one referent reflects the other. By and large, one's 
subjective interests detennine one's subjective goals . For example, if an individual hates 
sports, it is highly unlikely that one of her goals would be to reach the Olympics. On the 
other side, individuals' projects become one of their desires. Let's say this same 
individual prefers theater and has made going to New York to see a Broadway play one 
of her goals. For her, viewing the play would come to be one of her desires . There is a 
commonsense connection between an individual's ends, in tenns of goals or projects, and 
her interests, which refer to her desires, needs, or preferences . The two concepts interact 
in such an essential way that, in practical tenns, allows for the ideas of ends and interests 
to be considered nearly the same. Thus, in order to pursue her own ends in service, a 
servant has to consider her personal interests and select a fonn of service activity that will 
include and satisfy these interests and fulfill her ends. 
This theory of ethical service appears to apply strict restrictions on the servant's 
behavior in that the servant must produce benefit for herself as well as for others. For 
example, she is not allowed to sacrifice her own interests in service; she is required to 
pursue her own ends in service action; and she must prioritize her interests in choosing a 
service activity in order to assure as best she can that the service is beneficial to her. 
However, this theory of ethical service actually grants a great deal of liberty to the 
servant in the selection of service activities. First, it allows the servant to determine what 
constitutes her own interests, goals, and projects. It recognizes that it is not the role of 
social or moral systems of thought to determine an individual's interests for her. Morality 
cannot demand that individuals enjoy politics over the outdoors, art more than sports, or 
reading instead of writing. These constitute personal preferences which contribute to an 
individual's assessment of what inspires her own happiness . It would represent a 
violation of an individual's personal autonomy to have her desires or interests decided for 
her. Instead, this theory of ethical service agrees that servants are free to prefer those 
interests that they naturally enjoy . Second , this theory of ethical service lets the servant 
determine whom she serves given the many available options of service action. Based on 
the pluralistic nature of service, individuals necessarily choose the service activity they 
will perform; in my theory, they are able to choose what type of service they want to 
perform. As a result, third, individuals do not have strict obligations with respect to 
public service as far as specific benefactors, activities, or commitment. Individuals ought 
not to feel that one form of service is definitely better than another. While ethical service 
is valuable to both parties of the service dynamic, servants are given the chance to assess 
the value of a potential service experience in terms of how the service will benefit them. 
To provide a practical example of my theory, the volunteer who enjoys children 
and the outdoors is not required to work with an organization that rehabilitates juvenile 
delinquents on backpacking trips ; however, she is required to pursue a service activity 
that she believes will produce more benefits than costs for her . It appears logical that a 
service organization that mirrors her personal interests would most likely benefit her 
more than one that opposes her general personal preferences. One would think that, for 
this individual , working for the National Outdoor Leadership School would be a more 
suitable service choice than working for a state congressmen. Given the likelihood of her 
receiving more benefits from the service than costs, it is a more justified decision as we11. 
Of course, in order for her eventual service to be ethical, the service must benefit the 
individuals being served as well as herself as servant. 
My theory of ethical service has two important implications that disagree with 
traditional perspectives on ethical service. First, by assigning equal moral restrictions on 
the interests of both the servant and the individuals being served, certain cases of service 
that are usually considered ethical are not justified. The service case in which the servant 
incurs a small net cost and many individuals receive a high degree of net benefit is 
unjustified according to this theory. While it is argued that this cost to the servant is of 
little ethical consequence in relation to the great net benefit that the individuals being 
served receive, one individual's sacrifice cannot be justified by the benefit it causes for 
others. The service case which results in the opposite outcome, where the individuals 
being served incur a small net cost and the servant receives a large net benefit, would not 
be considered ethical, because the individuals being served rightly appear as though they 
are being used as mere instruments in the servant's pursuit of her own ends. Although it 
is not usually considered this way, when the servant incurs a net cost for the net benefit of 
others, the servant ought to be equally viewed as being used as a means to advance 
others' ends. This is what equality demands. 
This theory of ethical service also contradicts traditional perspectives on ethical 
servant motivation. Established in the literature review, the other-oriented ends of 
leadership and service encourage the view that ethical leader and servant motivation is 
altruistic. This theory instead requires that servants pursue their own ends in service 
action. This demands a significant degree of self-interest in ethical servants, because they 
must prioritize their own interests in the selection of service activities . Since the service's 
production of benefit for the servant as well as for others is what detennines whether the 
service is justified, the intention to serve others in order to procure benefit for oneself 
must be deemed ethical. Thus, it is pennissible for the servant to serve others out of self-
interested motivation. However, by not requiring self-interested motivation in ethical 
service, service actions in which motivations are not necessarily self-interested are also 
justified. For example, the volunteer who intends to benefit others with little concern for 
producing self-benefit may engage in ethical service if she ultimately receives more 
benefits than costs in serving others . However, the service of the self-interested servant 
which, even though she had intended to benefit from service and anticipated that 
outcome, is unjustified if she does not ultimately receive more rewards than costs through 
serving others. Service action is justified by its consequences; however, service's 
required outcome influences the possibilities of ethical motivation. In contrast to 
traditional perspectives, proposing that the servant's net benefit be a required outcome of 
service action allows for self-interest to serve as ethical servant motivation . 
A complication arises in evaluating the service of individuals who understand the 
ends of others as their own ends . If we grant individuals the right to decide what consists 
of their own interests and ends, then it follows that people may understand the ends of 
others as their own ends. Applied to my theory of ethical service, the servant can work 
for the benefit of others and, if that benefit is secured, it signifies that the rewards 
outweigh the costs for her. Mother Teresa is a classic example of this altruistic servant. 
She serves others to produce benefit for them and does so purely out of her love for them 
and her disregard for herself. The service of the Mother Teresa-type servant is unjustified 
as long as she disregards her own interests. However, when the servant does not accept 
the ends of others as substitutes for her own ends, but instead, regards the service as 
providing benefit for her, the service is justified. In order for the service to be ethical, the 
servant must understand that its benefit to her, even if the benefit includes feelings of 
purposefulness, satisfaction, and accomplishment which depend upon the value she 
assigns to helping others, is in part what justifies the service. Ultimately, only when the 
ends of others agree with the servant's separate, individual, and personal projects can the 
servant be justified in having chosen to perform the service. 
My theory of ethical service action, in which the servant ethically prioritizes his 
own interests in service justified by its production of benefit for everyone involved, has 
important implications for leadership generally. Leadership, one version of which is 
sometimes seen as service, is also a long-term commitment of an individual's time, effort, 
and interests. Just as service consists of a relationship between servants and the 
individuals being served, leadership is often viewed as a relational dynamic between 
leaders and followers. While service and leadership share many attributes, the principal 
similarity is their other-oriented purpose. This explains why leadership is often referred 
to as public service. Based on their other-oriented objective, both leadership and service 
exist to further the ends of others and are justified when others receive benefit. Thus, my 
theory of ethical service neatly applies to nearly all cases ofleadership. One of its 
implications for ethical leadership is that it, leadership, is justified in the case that not 
only the benefits outweigh the costs for the followers but also the benefits outweigh the 
costs for the leaders. The theory maintains that no matter how great the net benefit 
leadership causes for followers, leadership is unjustified if the leader does not receive net 
benefit as well. With regard to ethical leader behavior, leaders therefore cannot justifiably 
sacrifice their own interests for the interests of others; they are required to pursue their 
own ends in leadership; and they are required to prioritize their own interests in selecting 
leadership positions. They are allowed to accept or decline leadership opportunities based 
upon how they will benefit from the experience. This requires that leaders act self-
interestedly in leadership, a proposal that does not resound well with traditional 
perspectives on leadership's objectives, and its corresponding values, as other-oriented 
concerns. Thus, my theory for ethical service when applied to the leadership context is at 
odds with traditional perspectives on ethical leadership and ethical leader motivation. 
My thesis works from the perspective that we, as members of the human 
community, are required to help others. We are not allowed to live completely 
egoistically - we can neither exploit not entirely ignore other people. To remain morally 
responsible individuals, we must engage in some form of positive interaction with other 
human beings. Both leadership and service represent vehicles in which we can help 
others. In the special case of service, we help others in high social need. What my thesis 
aims to redress is the common assumption that, since the objective of service and 
leadership is highly other-interested, the justification for service as well as leadership is 
solely determined by the production of benefit for others. In this justification, the 
interests of servants and leaders are not granted equal consideration in the ethical 
evaluation of either service or leadership. In contrast, my theory assures that servants' 
ends are recognized as equally morally valuable as the ends of others and, therefore, of 
equal moral consequence to the detetmination of the ethics of service or leadership. I 
argue that, in order for servants to assure as best they can that they too will benefit from 
service action, they must prioritize their interests over the interests of some others in 
selecting service activities. The same can be applied to ethical leader behavior. This 
implication of my thesis considers the multiplicity of service and leadership opportunities 
available and concludes that both servants and leaders ought to pursue those activities in 
which they will not only inspire beneficial change for the individuals they are serving but 
also secure substantial benefit for themselves. 
.. 
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